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Chapter 6
The Effect of Uncertain Labor Income
and Social Security on Life-Cycle Portfolios
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla
Risky labor income and pension payouts are key determinants of retire-
ment well-being and investment behavior over the life cycle. In the past,
defined benefit (DB) pension plans and social security benefits provided a
substantial and relatively stable component of retirement wealth, whereas
more recently, labor market flexibility has grown, along with defined
contribution (DC) plans. As a result, households will be required to take
on increased responsibility for retirement accumulation and decumulation
in a more uncertain world. This chapter examines how consumers can
optimally allocate their saving among two major asset classes, namely,
equity and bonds, and two types of retirement assets, namely, liquid saving
and illiquid annuities. We illustrate how incorporating labor income risk as
well as social security benefits influences optimal asset allocation, in a
realistically calibrated dynamic life-cycle model.
Our study extends prior literature by taking into account life annuities
that pay a defined stream of benefits over the remaining lifetime (e.g.,
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005). This work evaluates the impact of
alternative empirical labor income trajectories, allowing for an observed
inverted-U-shaped age-related pay profile as well as volatility around that
profile. We use this approach to assess how differences in earnings profiles
and shocks may drive life-cycle investment behavior and the demand for
annuities. We also build on our own prior work (Horneff et al. 2009, 2010)
that shows that households can benefit substantially from holding annu-
ities as well as capital market assets. As demonstrated there, the particular
appeal of annuities is that they offer consumers not only an investment
return from the underlying assets but also the survival credit generated
from pooling mortality risk.1 These papers provide insight into how a
reasonable investor would optimally save and invest her wealth across
bonds, stocks, and annuities, taking into account various levels of social
security replacement rates.
In what follows, we model the effect of uncertain labor income and social
security benefit replacement ratios on life-cycle portfolios. After outlining
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the empirical framework employed, we present results on optimal expected
consumption, saving, asset allocation, and annuity purchases for represen-
tative households. We show that higher labor income risk and lower social
security replacement rates will induce higher demand for stable income –
not only in retirement but also earlier in life. In other words, individuals
exposed to labor earnings risk can, to some extent, ‘roll their own’ personal
DB scheme by resorting to the private annuity market. We also show that a
declining equity glide path with age is appropriate for both low- and
middle-income risk workers, while, for the high-income risk worker, equity
exposure rises until retirement.
Empirical strategy
To illustrate how different levels of labor income uncertainty and social
security retirement benefits affect outcomes of interest, we examine the
case of an individual who is assumed to work from the age of 20 until
retirement at age 65, after which she expects to rely on social security
benefits, withdrawals from liquid saving, and privately purchased life
annuity income.2 The maximum assumed survival age is 100. She can
invest her liquid saving in riskless bonds or risky stocks, and she may
also purchase immediate real fixed payout annuities, both before and
after retirement. The individual anticipates surviving from period t to
tþ1 with probability pst , which is her subjective probability. She derives
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility from consumption of a
single nondurable good C. The value function is maximized over the
arguments Ct, t, and at according to Vt ¼ C 1rt1r þ bpst Et ½Vtþ1, where æ is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  is a time discount factor, t is
the share of liquid assets held in equities, and at refers to annuity
purchases each period.3 The individual is precluded from borrowing
against future labor income and from short-selling bonds, stocks, and
life annuities.
A topic of considerable recent interest is how to model labor income
uncertainty.4 We posit that each period’s labor income Yt is given by
Yt ¼ expð f ðt ÞÞPtUt with Pt ¼ Pt1Nt ; where f(t) represents a hump-shaped
income profile over the life cycle often used in empirical research
(Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 2005). Here, Pt represents the perma-
nent human capital component and Nt allows for stochastic changes; Ut is
a transitory shock; u is the volatility of the transitory shock, and n of the
permanent shock.5 In retirement (t>K ), we assume (for simplicity) that
the individual receives constant and real social security benefits with a
constant benefit replacement ratio (z) with respect to final salary, expressed
as Yt ¼ zexp

f ðK Þ

PK , where K is the final year of work.
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Our benchmark case for an illustrative consumer sets preference para-
meters to standard values found in the life-cycle literature: the relative risk
aversion coefficient is æ ¼ 5, and the discount factor  ¼ 0.96 (e.g., Gomes
and Michaelides 2005). Representing subjective survival probabilities, we
apply nonlinear least squares to fit the Gompertz force of mortality to the
2000 population basic mortality table for US females. To calculate the
actuarial premium of a life payout annuity, we use annuitant mortality
tables and include expense loading º of 7.2 percent, consistent with Mitchell
et al. (1999). The household can directly invest in two financial assets:
riskless bonds and risky stocks. The riskless real bond gross return is
2 percent, while the real risky stock return is log-normally distributed
with an expected return of 6 percent and a volatility of 18 percent as in
much of the literature. The deterministic age-dependent labor income
function for an individual with only a high-school education is taken
from Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). The assumed base case social
security replacement rate Ç of 68 percent is currently typical of low-wage
retirees in the United States (Mitchell and Phillips 2006). In an alternative
scenario, we also show how outcomes would change with a lower replace-
ment rate of 50 percent; this figure is consistent with replacement ratios for
low-wage earners in Japan (OECD 2009: 39). These two alternatives are of
interest given that Japan’s current demographic situation and social secu-
rity shortfalls may well presage the future for the United States.
The labor income volatility parameters for the base case are n ¼ 0.05
and u ¼ 0.075, representing a labor income profile with relatively low risk;
here correlations between the stock returns and the permanent (transito-
ry) income shocks are set to fn ¼ 0ðfu ¼ 0Þ. In the alternative scenario, we
evaluate results using a much higher labor income risk volatility of four
times the base level as well as fn ¼ 0:25. In sensitivity analysis, we also show
results for lower (æ¼ 3) and higher (æ¼ 8) levels of risk aversion.6 Table 6.1
summarizes model parameters.
Table 6.1 Behavioral and market parameters employed in empirical analysis
n u çn Ç æ
Low 0.05 0.075 0.00 0.50 3
Medium 0.10 0.200 0.00 0.60 5
High 0.20 0.300 0.25 0.68 8
Notes: n and u refer, respectively, to the volatility of the permanent and transitory income
shocks, çn is the correlation of labor income risk with stock returns, Ç is the social security
replacement rate, and æ is the relative risk aversion coefficient; see text.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Life-cycle patterns of investment, saving,
and consumption
The base case investor is one with low labor income risk, high social security
replacement rate, and medium risk aversion, who faces incomplete private
markets for immediate annuities with high loadings. Results appear in
Figure 6.1, which displays the expected development of labor income,
consumption, liquid saving, annuity purchases, and annuity income from
age 20 to 100. To generate a smooth lifetime consumption path, the worker
saves from her 30s to her mid-50s so as to pay for later consumption. By her
late 50s, liquid assets – outside of annuities – rise to a maximum of almost
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Figure 6.1 Life-cycle asset allocation patterns: low labor income risk and high
social security replacement rate. Notes : The Figure embodies a retirement age
of 65, replacement rate of 68%, annuity loading of 7.2%, moderate risk aversion
(æ ¼ 5), volatility of transitory income shock ¼ 7.5%, volatility of permanent
income shock ¼ 5%, and correlation of permanent labor income shock with
equity returns ¼ 0 (see text). Labor income, consumption, liquid assets, annuity
purchases, and annuity payouts are expressed as a multiple of first-year labor
income. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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11 times her starting or initial labor income. After that, the investor
gradually starts drawing down assets to compensate for declining labor
income; after about age 60, liquid assets are deployed to buy private
annuities. From retirement at age 65, liquid assets are depleted rapidly
permitting the retiree to maintain preretirement consumption; as well, she
relies increasingly on income flowing from private annuities, which she
continues to buy even well beyond retirement age. In her early 80s, her
liquid assets are fully exhausted because she has no bequest motive; after
that point, the annuity payout stream is considerable, helping maintain a
smooth consumption path throughout her remaining lifetime.
Figure 6.2 indicates how liquid assets, as a multiple of first-year labor
income, and saving rates are expected to change with age. The saving rate is
defined as SRate t ¼ 1 Ct=Incomet and Income refers to the flow of labor
income and annuity benefits.7 The base case is represented by the solid
line, for the low labor income risk/high social security replacement rate
scenario. In this safer world, the individual has little need to save early in
life: the saving rate is low at young ages and only from the mid-20s does
saving rise, with a peak in the mid-40s of 10 percent per year, and it
becomes negative (5%) in the mid-50s. After retirement, saving rates
drop precipitously and reach 40 percent so as to smooth consumption;
the elderly, older than about age 85, have a saving rate of zero. Liquid assets
grow slowly early in life, rising to around 10 times first-year labor income at
their peak.
In the riskier scenario, the social security replacement rate is reduced to
50 percent, and labor income risk is four times the base level and correlated
with the stock market. Here, the young adult will engage in substantially
higher saving to build a buffer against high labor income volatility – over
40 percent per annum. Assets rise to 40 times first-year income by the late
50s. Next, the saving rate falls, crossing the zero mark around the early 60s;
thereafter it rises again briefly just before retirement to offset low social
security benefits. As we shall show next, the money is used mainly to
purchase annuities that provide a secondary stable income stream in retire-
ment. Nevertheless, this individual’s liquid saving continues to rise through
the mid-50s, due to returns on investment. After retirement, at 65, when
the social security benefit begins, assets are consumed, and the saving rate
trajectory follows the one described earlier.
Turning to Figure 6.3, the three Panels illustrate how the individual will
optimally allocate her total financial wealth by age across equities, bonds,
and private annuities; here, total financial wealth is defined to include both
liquid assets and the present value of future private annuity income claims.
On average, as is indicated in Panel A, the base case individual (solid line)
will optimally hold only equities from youth to about age 50 (apart from a
few bonds early on, shown in Panel B). This is a common result in many
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Figure 6.2 Liquid assets and saving rates for low versus high labor income risk levels
and high versus low social security replacement rates. Panel A: Liquid assets. Panel B:
Saving rates. Notes : Liquid assets (held in stocks and bonds) are expressed as a
multiple of first-year labor income; saving rates are the percent of labor plus annuity
income saved. LLIR þ RR 68% stands for low labor income risk, high (68%) social
security replacement rate; HLIR þ RR 50% stands for high labor income risk, low
(50%) social security replacement rate. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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life-cycle studies and occurs because, early in life, the individual’s main
asset is human capital that has bond-like payout characteristics. This is
especially true with low labor income uncertainty, where her relatively
safe labor income is also protected in retirement with a relatively high
social security benefit. She will optimally diversify her complete portfolio,
which includes both the present value of her human capital (labor income
plus social security benefits) as well as financial assets, by holding little to
nothing in bonds and instead invests entirely in equities. Beginning about
age 55, her asset allocation begins to include more bonds as her remaining
work years dwindle.
The optimal pattern for privately purchased annuities is illustrated in
Panel C; these play no role in the investor’s portfolio prior to the age of 59,
as they are relatively unattractive vis-a`-vis bonds due to high loading and the
use of annuitant survival tables in pricing. At older ages, however, the
annuity survival credit rises above the bond rate; as a result, annuities
crowd out bonds. In retirement, liquid assets are depleted to support
consumption and buy annuities, which provide a secure private income
stream (assuming no bequests). Beginning in her early 80s, the retiree is
fully annuitized.
These results should be contrasted to those generated by the alternative
scenario with high labor income uncertainty and low social security replace-
ment rates.8 In general, we would expect that this consumer will need to
save more, and hold more safe assets. This is borne out in Panels A–C
(dashed line), where the equity fraction starts at zero and even in middle
age remains below 30 percent; by contrast the bond fraction starts out at
100 percent and falls as the worker nears retirement. This is because labor
income no longer produces a bond-like stream of payments that previously
pushed the young investor into equities. This investor also demands more
annuities, beginning around age 45, to help offset variable work earnings.
The annuitized fraction then rises quickly around retirement, to help offset
the now-low social security replacement rates. Around age 60, the rising
survival credit dominates the annuity pricing offsets due to loads and the
use of annuitant mortality tables. In all cases the transition to annuities is
accomplished by a substantial movement out of bonds: her allocation to
bonds drops from 65 to about 15 percent. As in the base case, the individual
is fully annuitized from age 83 onward. It is also worth noting that, around
age 65 when she becomes entitled to social security benefits, she is no
longer exposed to labor income risk. Accordingly, the stabile private
annuity income plus the social security payments permits the investor to
hold more equities. Thus, equity exposure rises to over 40 percent, and
then it gradually declines in favor of annuities, until liquid savings are
exhausted at age 83.9
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Figure 6.3 Life-cycle asset allocation for low versus high labor income risk levels and
high versus low social security replacement rates. Panel A: Equity weights. Panel B:
Bond weights. Panel C: Annuity weights. Notes : Asset weights expressed as a percent-
age of total wealth (liquid assetsþ present value of annuity claims). LLIRþ RR 68%
stands for low labor income risk, high (68%) social security replacement rate;
HLIR þ RR 50% stands for high labor income risk, low (50%) social security
replacement rate. Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Sensitivity analysis
Next we review how results change across six combinations of labor income
risk levels and social security replacement rates; comparative results appear
in Table 6.2. Panel 1 focuses on the high social security replacement rate
scenario and reports liquid assets, saving rates, and asset allocation fractions,
for three workers: the low income volatility case (the base case from earlier),
a high volatility case (the alternative scenario defined earlier), and a middle
risk case (defined as n ¼ 0.10, u ¼ 0.20, and fn ¼ 0). Panel 2 indicates the
same results for a lower social security benefit replacement rate of 50 per-
cent. We report patterns for 5 decades of life from age 45 to 85.
Comparing Panels 1 and 2 for all three levels of labor income risk, it is
evident that the Panel 2 individual (with lower old-age benefits) accumu-
lates more liquid assets (row 6 versus row 1) by saving more early in life (row
7 versus row 2) but she draws down her assets more quickly after retire-
ment, so as to preserve her consumption stream. Now, moving horizontally
across the table, irrespective of social security benefit levels, as labor in-
come risk rises, so too do liquid assets. For example, even by age 45, the
high labor income risk individual has amassed assets five times more due to
a much higher saving rate (17.4 percent versus 8.5 percent).10
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Moving horizontally across the table, it is clear that more labor income
risk reduces the demand for equities (rows 3 and 8), irrespective of the
social security replacement rate. Similarly, higher income risk makes an-
nuities more attractive at younger ages, in all cases (rows 5 and 10). As seen
earlier, a declining equity glide path with age is appropriate for both low-
and middle-income risk workers, while, for the high-income risk worker,
equity exposure optimally rises until retirement. Moving down the table, we
note that lower replacement rates prompt lower equity holdings for both
low- and middle-income risk workers, while bonds and annuities become
more desirable. For those facing high labor income risk, asset allocation
patterns are less sensitive to old-age benefit levels, though the direction is
similar.
Next we investigate the sensitivity of our results with respect to the
investor’s level of risk aversion. In addition to the base case risk parameter
(ª¼ 5) analyzed earlier, Table 6.3 tabulates results for low (ª¼ 3) and high
(ª ¼ 8) relative risk aversion levels, assuming the worker has a medium
labor income volatility (so she is exposed to risk other than through the
capital market). As before, Panel 1 presents patterns of liquid saving and
saving rates, as well as allocations to equities, bonds, and annuities for the
high social security replacement rate; Panel 2 provides results for the lower
value.
Here, as risk aversion rises (moving horizontally across the table), liquid
assets and expected saving rates again rise (rows 1, 2, 6, and 7), irrespective
of the social security replacement rate; that is, higher risk aversion en-
hances the appeal of saving. Moving down the table, when social security
benefits are reduced at a given level of labor uncertainty, higher saving
rates and liquid assets are observed at younger, but not at older, ages. Also,
as we move to the right in the table, as risk aversion rises, it is evident and
unsurprising that the fraction in equities falls in favor of bonds and an-
nuities. Going down a column, when the replacement rate drops, again the
equity fraction falls – though it is interesting that at age 85, the least risk-
averse consumer still holds 15 percent of her portfolio in equities. In all
three cases, bonds dominate at younger ages, while annuities crowd out
bonds at older ages.
Conclusion
Retirement risk management is likely to become increasingly important
with global demographic aging, a phenomenon already requiring social
security benefit cuts in some developed nations such as Japan. This chapter
illustrates how increasing labor income risk and reductions in social secu-
rity replacement rates would be predicted to influence saving, life-cycle
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portfolio asset demand, and purchases of payout annuities. Our model
shows that higher labor income risk and lower social security replacement
rates boost saving rates early in life and liquid assets accumulated for
precautionary purposes. A more uncertain and less generous environment
also induces greater demand for protection in the form of stable income –
early in life and in retirement. The enhanced need for safety is met not only
with bonds, but also with payout annuities whereas the demand for equities
falls. Also, individuals who are more risk averse save more early in life, and
hold fewer equities.
Our analysis offers several useful implications. For instance, financial
advisers must be aware of possible future social security benefit cuts as
they design optimal lifetime asset accumulation paths and portfolio alloca-
tions for younger clients. Also, the financial services industry and pension
sponsors must take careful account of labor income risk when formulating
recommendations for client portfolios. Thus, we show that low- and mid-
dle-income risk workers will favor an equity glide path that declines with
age, but for those facing high income risk, equity exposure should be low
early in life and rise until retirement. Moreover, for those with uncertain
labor income, it is desirable to purchase immediate payout annuities early
in life so as to build up a second more stable stream of income. Our work
underscores the need for workers to have a way to create their own ‘DB
plan equivalents’ with privately purchased payout annuities.
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Notes
1 For additional references to the rapidly growing literature on realistically cali-
brated discrete dynamic portfolio choice models, see Horneff et al. (2009, 2010)
and Wachter and Yogo (2009).
2 For a more detailed description of the modeling approach see Horneff et al.
(2009, 2010); flexible hours and endogenous retirement ages are considered in
Chai et al. (2009).
3 For this analysis, we assume that the household derives no utility from bequests.
Hurd (1989) suggests that most bequests are accidental.
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4 Notable prior studies on asset allocation that consider uninsurable labor income
risk include Campbell and Viceira (2002), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Viceira
(2001), Bodie et al. (2004), and Polkovnichenko (2007).
5 The logarithms of both Nt and Ut are normally distributed with means 0 and with
volatilities n and u, respectively. The shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated.
6 We solve the optimization problem by backward induction in a three-dimension-
al state space, whereby for each grid point we evaluate the policy and value
functions using Gaussian quadrature integration and cubic spline interpolation.
For technical details, we refer the interested reader to Horneff, Maurer, and
Stamos (2008) and Horneff et al. (2009, 2010).
7 Here, we report the saving rate as SRatet ¼ 1 E ðCt Þ=E ðIncomet Þ; in unreport-
ed results, we have also computed SRatet ¼ 1 E ðCt=Incomet Þ which is substan-
tially lower in the high risk/low replacement rate scenario.
8 These are partial equilibrium computations, in that lower social security benefit
are not offset by social security tax cuts.
9 This is because of the increasing survival credit at older ages, which raises
expected annuity payouts vis-a`-vis equities (Horneff et al. 2009, 2010).
10 In the medium-income labor case, the saving rate is always lower than for the
low-income risk case, though liquid assets are higher in all cases. This is due to
the fact that this medium-income risk individual saves from a younger age, and at
a higher rate (in results available on request).
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